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Private Plaintiffs and the Public Interest
Defamation law historically has been a subject of great contro-
versy.' A defamatory communication injures an individual's reputa-
tion or subjects that person to hatred, contempt, or ridicule.2 The
defamation action protects the plaintiffs right to be free from defama-
tory falsehood 3 by holding one who makes a defamatory communica-
tion liable in damages to the injured party.4 The law prohibiting
defamatory statements often conflicts with the first amendment rights
of freedom of the press and freedom of speech.5 In a series of deci-
sions, the United States Supreme Court has set forth guidelines that
strike a balance between the plaintiffs reputation interest and the de-
fendant's and the public's first amendment rights.6 These decisions
have rendered obsolete some of the prior common law rules regarding
defamation.7
In California, the common law rules were codified in the Califor-
I. See Bemey, Libel and the First Amendment-A New Constitutional Privilege, 51 VA.
L. REv. 1 (1965); Meiklejohn, Public Speech and the First Amendment, 55 GEO. L.J. 234
(1967); Pedrick, Freedom of the Press and the Law ofLibel: The Modern Revised Translation,
49 CORNELL L.Q. 581 (1964).
2. Stevens v. Snow, 191 Cal. 58, 62, 214 P. 968, 969 (1923). A more modem and more
inclusive definition is found in REsTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1965), which
states that defamation is the false communication about another that "tends so to harm [the
other's] reputation ... as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third
persons from associating with him."
3. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974).
4. See Albi v. Street & Smith Publications, 140 F.2d 310, 311 (9th Cir. 1944).
5. U.S. CONsT. amend. I. "One of the essentials to this democratic way of life is a
flow of information enabling the individuals comprising society to discharge their various
decisional responsibilities-to make up their minds. But the sheer mass of available infor-
mation, the certain knowledge that some part of what may pass for information is misinfor-
mation, false and sometimes mischievous, clogging the rational processes of public debate
and threatening unwarranted damage to individuals, calls for some mechanism to secure a
minimum standard of responsibility in the transmission of information." Pedrick, Freedom
f the Press and the Law of Libe- The Modern Revised Translation, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 581
(1964).
6. The chronological development of this trend can be seen in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Rosen-
bloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323
(1974). Prior to these decisions, the Supreme Court had followed a bifurcated approach to
the first amendment. Defamatory falsehood, a well-defined and narrowly limited category
of speech, was not protected by the first amendment because it inflicted injury by its very
utterance. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). All other speech essential to
the exposition of ideas was constitutionally protected. Id.
7. See notes 103-05 & accompanying text infra.
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nia Civil Code in 1872 and have changed little since that time.8 These
statutes and the judicial interpretations given them over the years, par-
ticularly in actions involving media defendants, require a re-evaluation
in light of current developments in defamation law.
This Comment first describes relevant aspects of the defamation
action at common law, including the concept of privilege and the dem-
onstration of malice required to overcome a privilege and then exam-
ines recent United States Supreme Court decisions and the
constitutional parameters that they establish. Next, the Comment ex-
plores the development of California law with respect to the public in-
terest privilege, which makes any communication concerning a matter
of sufficient public interest privileged, and with respect to the Califor-
nia common law malice standard. Although not declaring the public
interest privilege unconstitutional, the United States Supreme Court
has disfavored this privilege. A recent California court of appeal deci-
sion, Rollenhagen v. City of Orange,9 however, resurrected the public
interest privilege in actions involving a private plaintiff and a media
defendant. After evaluating this decision, the Comment concludes that
the public interest privilege is too vague and presents too great a barrier
to private plaintiffs bringing defamation actions against media defend-
ants. 0 Thus, the Comment urges that the privilege be discarded. Cali-
fornia courts should follow the lead of the United States Supreme
Court and determine the degree of protection accorded a media de-
fendant by ascertaining whether the plaintiff is a "private" or a "pub-
lic" person, rather than by focusing on the subject matter of the
communication.
8. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 44-48 (1872) (currently codified at CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 44-48
(West 1954 & Supp. 1981)). CAL. CIV. CODE § 48a, added to the Civil Code in 1931, limits
the liability of media defendants when a retraction is not requested by the plaintiff or, if
requested, when the retraction is made by the defendant. See Werner v. Southern Cal. Ass'd
Newspapers, 35 Cal. 2d 121, 216 P.2d 825 (1950). CAL. CIV. CODE § 45a, added in 1945,
provides that certain defamatory publications are libelous on their face and that actual dam-
ages need not be proven in such situations. See Dethelfsen v. Stull, 86 Cal. App. 2d 499,
501-03, 195 P.2d 56, 58 (1948). In 1949, CAL. CIV. CODE § 48.5 (West 1954) was added to
prevent owners, operators, and employees of radio and television stations from incurring
liability for defamatory statements made by others with their facilities when such owners,
operators, and employees exercise due care to prevent the broadcast of such statements. See
Correia v. Santos, 191 Cal. App. 2d 844, 855-56, 13 Cal. Rptr. 132, 138-39 (1961).
9. 116 Cal. App. 3d 414, 172 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1981).
10. Because the California courts use the analysis set forth by the United States
Supreme Court when a public official or public figure brings a defamation action against a
media defendant, see note 103 & accompanying text infra, the public interest privilege has




To establish a prima facie case of libel or slander" at common
law, a plaintiff has to show that the defendant made a false, defamatory
publication to a third person who understood that the publication con-
cerned the plaintiff.12 When a defendant's statement is not privileged,
the defendant is held strictly liable for the defamatory comment; the
reasonableness of the defendant's conduct is irrelevant. 13 Often liabil-
ity is established against the defendant without proof of actual
damages. 14
An allegation of defamation at common law can be rebutted by
demonstrating that the communication was privileged, that is, that the
statement was made under circumstances allowing the defendant to es-
cape liability for what otherwise would be a defamatory statement.' 5
Privileges exist when the defendant is acting to further some socially
important interest.' 6 One privilege of particular importance is that of
fair comment on matters of public concern. 17
11. The term "defamation" includes the common law concepts of "libel" and "slan-
der." See generally L. ELDRIDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION §§ 12-15, at 77-90 (1978); W.
PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 111-12, at 737-66 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PRos-
SER]. Although there are some differences between the rules governing libel and slander,
PROSSER, supra, §§ 111-12 at 737-66, the explication of these minor differences is beyond the
scope of this Comment. In California, libel includes publications by newspapers and
magazines, see CAL. CIw. CODE § 45 (West 1954), whereas radio and television broadcasts
are considered slander, see CAL. CIw. CODE § 46 (West 1954). This Comment concentrates
on all media defendants; thus, the broader term "defamation" is used to include publication
by all types of media.
12. Lackey v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 26 Tenn. App. 564, 579, 174 S.W.2d 575, 581
(1943). See generally 50 AM. JuR. 2d Libel and Slander § 11 (1970); 53 C.J.S. Libel and
Slander § 82a (1948). "Publication" is defined in defamation law as a communication by
any means to one other than the person being defamed. PROSSER, supra note 11, § 113.
13. See Taylor v. Hearst, 107 Cal. 262, 270, 40 P. 392, 393-94 (1895); PROSSER, supra
note 11, § 113, at 772-74.
14. Childers v. San Jose Mercury Printing & Publishing Co., 105 Cal. 284, 289, 38 P.
903, 904 (1894).
15. Swaffield v. Universal Ecsco Corp., 271 Cal. App. 2d 147, 163, 76 Cal. Rptr. 680,
690 (1969).
16. See Bradley v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 30 Cal. App. 3d 818, 826, 106 Cal.
Rptr. 718, 723 (1973). Examples of privileged publications are statements made in judicial
or legislative proceedings, Frisk v. Merrihew, 42 Cal. App. 3d 319, 322-23, 116 Cal. Rptr.
781, 782-83 (1974); CAL. CIw. CODE § 47(2) (West 1954), reports of such proceedings in a
public journal, Kurata v. Los Angeles News Publishing Co., 4 Cal. App. 2d 224, 228,40 P.2d
520, 522 (1935); CAL. CIV. CODE § 47(4) (West 1954), and statements made between hus-
band and wife. Communications between husband and wife are not considered "publica-
tions" and therefore are not actionable. Dyer v. McDougall, 93 F. Supp. 44, 46 (E.D.N.Y.
1950); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 592 (1977); PROSSER, supra note 11, § 114, at
785.
17. See generally 50 AM. Jun. 2d Libel and Slander §§ 289-310 (1970). Some writers
distinguish the privilege of fair comment from qualified privilege as being qualitatively dif-
ferent. 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, TORTS §§ 5.26-5.28 (1956). In California, however, fair
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In some jurisdictions, the privilege of fair comment applies only to
opinions based upon true facts and is lost if false statements of fact are
made.' 8 In other jurisdictions, including California, the privilege cov-
ers false factual statements concerning a proper subject of fair com-
ment. 19 This qualified privilege of fair comment can be lost if the
statement is made under circumstances evidencing unreasonableness,
such as excessive publication or lack of belief in its truth. The privilege
can also be lost if the statement extends beyond the group interest or is
made for an improper purpose.20
In addition, showing that the defendant acted with "actual malice"
will overcome the qualified privilege. 21 Malice at common law in-
cludes actual or express hatred or ill will. 22 The presence of malice can
be shown by circumstantial evidence,23 but the object of proof is the
motive to harm the plaintiff.2 4
comment is subject to the same rules as other qualified privileges, and thus the two may be
categorized together. See text accompanying notes 18-21 infra.
The privilege of fair comment has protected criticism of public officers, Snively v. Rec-
ord Publishing Co., 185 Cal. 565, 198 P. 1 (1921), candidates for public office, Desert Sun
Publishing Co. v. Superior Court, 97 Cal. App. 3d 49, 158 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1979), and the
manner in which the public work is performed, see Williams v. Daily Review, Inc., 236 Cal.
App. 2d 405, 46 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1965).
18. E.g., State Press Co. v. Bonner, 219 Ark. 850, 245 S.W.2d 403 (1952); Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Brautigam, 127 So. 2d 718 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S.
821 (1962); Proesel v. Myers Publishing Co., 24 Ill. App. 2d 501, 165 N.E.2d 352 (1960);
Foley v. Press Publishing Co., 226 App. Div. 535, 235 N.Y.S. 340 (1929); Bell Publishing Co.
v. Garrett Engineering Co., 141 Tex. 51, 170 S.W.2d 197 (1943).
19. E.g., Pearson v. Fairbanks Publishing Co., 413 P.2d 711 (Alaska 1966); Broking v.
Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 76 Ariz. 334, 264 P.2d 413 (1953); Snively v. Record Publishing
Co., 185 Cal. 565, 198 P. 1 (1921); Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co., 142 Conn.
605, 116 A.2d 440 (1955); Bailey v. Charleston Mail Ass'n, 126 W.Va. 292, 27 S.E.2d 837
(1943); see also 50 AM. JUR. 2d Libel and Slander § 293 (1970) (noting the divergence of
various jurisdictions in this regard).
20. Emde v. San Joaquin County Cent. Labor Council, 23 Cal. 2d 146, 154-55, 143
P.2d 20, 25 (1943); PROSSER, supra note 11, § 115, at 785-86. See generally RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 593-612 (1977) (summary of common law qualified privileges).
21. Williams v. Daily Review, Inc., 236 Cal. App. 2d 405, 416, 46 Cal. Rptr. 135, 143
(1965); CAL. CIV. CODE § 47(3) (West Supp. 1981).
22. Agarwal v. Johnson, 25 Cal. 3d 932, 944-45, 603 P.2d 58, 66, 160 Cal. Rptr. 141,
148-49 (1979). Common law libel and slander also encompasses another type of malice,
malice in law, which involves the intentional doing of a wrongful act. This type of malice
was required for certain types of defamation actions, although its existence was presumed if
the defamatory nature of the communication was shown. Davis v. Hearst, 160 Cal. 143, 156-
61, 116 P. 530, 536-38 (1911).
23. Davis v. Hearst, 160 Cal. 143, 166, 116 P. 530, 538 (1911); 4 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY
OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts § 304 (8th ed. 1974).
24. Agarwal v. Johnson, 25 Cal. 3d 932, 944-45, 603 P.2d 58, 66, 160 Cal. Rptr. 141,
148-49 (1979): "[A]ctual malice [is] a state of mind arising from hatred or ill will, evidencing
a willingness to vex, annoy or injure another person. . . . The factual question is whether
the publication was so motivated."
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The Constitutionality of Common Law Defamation
In 1964, the United States Supreme Court first examined the con-
stitutionality of the common law standards of defamation. In New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan,25 Sullivan, the Commissioner of Public Af-
fairs for the City of Montgomery, Alabama, brought a civil libel action
against the New York Times for publishing an advertisement contain-
ing statements allegedly defaming Sullivan in his capacity as supervisor
of the city's police department. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed
the judgment in Sullivan's favor.26 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari 27 to consider whether the rule of liability used by the
Alabama courts abridged the freedoms of speech and of the press guar-
anteed by the first and fourteenth amendments.
28
Under Alabama law, a public officer about whom false defama-
tory statements were published by a media defendant was entitled to
actual damages to the same extent as a private individual29 and could
receive punitive damages if he or she showed that the defendant acted
with malice.30 The state law recognized that the privilege of "fair com-
ment" covered opinions of a public officer's work, but did not cover
false statements.3'
In analyzing the constitutionality of the Alabama law, the Court
first reaffirmed the Constitution's guarantee of open public debate and
criticism of the conduct of public officials. 32 The Court further noted
that, because erroneous statements were inevitable in free debate, they
must be tolerated if the first amendment freedoms are "to have the
'breathing space' that they 'need. .. to survive.' ,3 As the Alabama
law caused an unacceptable form of self-censorship by granting no
privilege to false statements, the law was held to be unconstitutional.
34
The Court held that, because Sullivan was a public official, he could
not recover for defamatory falsehoods relating to his official conduct
without establishing that the New York Times published the defama-
tory statements with "actual malice,"' 35 which it defined as "knowledge
25. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
26. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 273 Ala. 656, 144 So. 2d 25 (1963), rev'd, 376 U.S.
254 (1964).
27. 371 U.S. 946 (1963).
28. 376 U.S. 254, 268 (1964).
29. Parsons v. Age-Herald Publishing Co., 181 Ala. 439, 450, 61 So. 345, 350 (1913).
30. Johnson Publishing Co. v. Davis, 271 Ala. 474, 487, 124 So. 2d 441, 450 (1960).
Malice could be shown by "evidence of hostility, rivalry, the violence of the language, [or]
the mode and extent of the publication including the recklessness of the prior information
regarding its falsity." Id.
31. Parsons v. Age-Herald Publishing Co., 181 Ala. 439, 450, 61 So. 345, 350 (1913).
32. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-71 (1964).
33. Id. at 271-72 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
34. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964).
35. Id. at 279-80.
March 1982] CALIFORNIA DEFAMATION LAW
that [the communication] was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not."'36
In New York Times, the Court set a new minimum standard for
recovery in defamation actions brought by public officials against me-
dia defendants. 37 A law protecting only opinions and not false state-
ments was held unconstitutional. 38 Even in jurisdictions in which false
statements concerning public officials were protected unless overcome
by the common law showing of malice, New York Times added a re-
quirement that reckless disregard of the truth or knowledge of falsity be
shown before liability could be imposed. 39 There is no requirement
under New York Times, however, that the defendant harbor the com-
mon law malice-hatred or ill will towards the plaintiff.40
The plaintiff's status was examined by the Court in the companion
cases of Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and Associated Press v. Walker.4'
Recognizing that reports involving prominent individuals unassociated
with government office often deserve constitutional protection, the
Court extended the New York Times rule to "public figures."' 42 A pub-
lic figure occupies a position of pervasive power or influence, or ac-
tively attempts to influence a particular public controversy.43 Thus, a
36. Id. at 280.
37. See PROSSER, supra note 11, § 118; see also Note, Trial Court Dificulties in Applying
the New Rule of Fair Mistake to Civil Libel, 48 MARQ. L. REV. 128 (1964).
38. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964).
39. California law protected false statements concerning public officials unless common
law malice could be proved. See note 19 & accompanying text supra. Following New York
Times, California courts have applied the federal actual malice standard to defamation ac-
tions brought by public officials against media defendants. See, e.g., Sierra Breeze v. Supe-
rior Court, 86 Cal. App. 3d 102, 149 Cal. Rptr. 914 (1978).
40. In New York Times, the Court required only a showing of reckless disregard of the
truth or knowledge of falsity. 376 U.S. at 280. The malice standard used in California,
which could be met by a showing of hatred or ill will, is not mentioned in the opinion.
41. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
42. The reasoning of the Court was expressed in the concurring opinion of Chief Jus-
tice Warren: "In many situations, policy determinations which traditionally were channeled
through formal political institutions are now originated and implemented through a com-
plex array of boards, committees, commissions, corporations, and associations, some only
loosely connected with the Government. This blending of positions and power has also
occurred in the case of individuals so that many who do not hold public office at the moment
are nevertheless intimately involved in the resolution of important public questions or, by
reason of their fame, shape events in areas of concern to society at large.
"Viewed in this context, then, it is plain that although they are not subject to the re-
straints of the political process, 'public figures', like 'public officials', often play an influential
role in ordering society. And surely as a class these 'public figures' have as ready access as
'public officials' to mass media of communication, both to influence policy and to counter
criticism of their views and activities. Our citizenry has a legitimate and substantial interest
in the conduct of such persons, and freedom of the press to engage in uninhibited debate
about their involvement in public issues and events is as crucial as it is in the case of 'public
officials.'" Id. at 163-64 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
43. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
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public figure, like a public official, must establish that the media de-
fendant published the defamatory statements with actual malice.
Subsequent to Butts and Walker, the Court re-examined the im-
portance of the plaintiffs status in defamation cases. In Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc.,44 Justice Brennan wrote the plurality opinion, in
which he suggested that the plaintiff must show actual malice to estab-
lish defamation whenever a matter of public interest was reported by
the media, regardless of the plaintiffs status.45 The plurality's inquiry
into whether a media publication was subject to the actual malice re-
quirement focused on the subject matter of the communication-
whether a matter of public interest was involved-rather than on the
plaintiffs notoriety or position." The plurality's proposition that all
matters of "public interest" were constitutionally protected by requir-
ing a showing of actual malice was not accepted by a majority of the
Court.4 7
The public interest approach was rejected by the Court only three
years later in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 48 In Gertz, the plaintiff was
an attorney representing the family of a victim of a police shooting in a
civil action against the policeman. The defendant had published an
article accusing Gertz of being a "Communist-fronter," involved in a
communist conspiracy to discredit the local police. Gertz brought a
libel action, and the district court entered judgment for the defendant,49
stating that the communication was a matter of public interest and that
the plaintiff had failed to prove actual malice.50 The Seventh Circuit
44. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
45. The Court cited with approval the court of appeal determination that "the fact that
plaintiff was not a public figure cannot be accorded decisive importance if the recognized
important guarantees of the First Amendment are to be adequately implemented." Id. at 40
(citing 415 F.2d 892, 896 (1969)).
46. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 45-48 (1971).
47. Justice Brennan's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Black-
mTun. Justice Black concurred in the judgment, but would have extended first amendment
protection to prohibit "the recovery of libel judgments against the news media even when
statements are broadcast with knowledge they are false." Id. at 57 (Black, J., concurring).
Justice White concurred in the result, but only because the report was a comment on the
official conduct of public officials, which would be uninformative without details about
others involved in the episode. Id. at 57, 61-62 (White, J., concurring). Justices Harlan,
Marshall and Stewart dissented, disagreeing with the extension of the New York Times rule
to public interest cases. Id. at 62 (Harlan, J., dissenting); id. at 78 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration of the case.
48. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
49. 322 F. Supp. 997 (N.D. 1ll. 1970), aft'd, 471 F.2d 801 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 418 U.S.
323 (1974).
50. Id. at 999-1000. Although Gertz was decided in the district court prior to the time
that the Supreme Court decided Rosenbloom, the district court anticipated that the Supreme
Court would extend the New York Times rule to any case involving a matter of public inter-
est. See 418 U.S. at 329-30.
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affirmed the judgment of the trial court.51
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the New York Times
rule did not apply to a plaintiff who was neither a public official nor a
public figure, despite the fact that the defamatory statements concerned
an issue of public or general interest.52 Recognizing that the first
amendment interests protected by the New York Times rule were not
absolute, the Court stated that these rights must be balanced against the
state's legitimate interest in compensating individuals for the harm in-
flicted by defamatory falsehoods.5 3 The Court noted that private indi-
viduals do not invite the "close public scrutiny" of more prominent
persons5 4 and that they lack the same access to the media possessed by
public figures and officials to rebut public criticism.5
In Gertz, the Court held unconstitutional the Illinois defamation
law also because it allowed strict liability in defamation cases involving
a private plaintiff and a media defendant.5 6 The Court held that "so
long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define
for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or
broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individ-
ual."' 57 Thus, while strict liability is unacceptable, private individuals
are not constitutionally required to show recklessness or intentional fal-
sification to recover against a media defendant. 58 "The state interest
[in compensating defamed plaintiffs] justifies a negligence standard for
51. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 471 F.2d 801 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 418 U.S. 323
(1974).
52. 418 U.S. 323, 345-48 (1974). The Court held that mere involvement in a matter of
public interest did not require the plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant acted with
actual malice. A plaintiffwho thrust himself or herself to the forefront of a particular public
controversy, however, might be deemed a public figure, thus requiring the plaintiff to
demonstrate actual malice before liability could be established. Id. at 345. In Time Inc. v.
Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976), the Supreme Court reiterated that it was necessary for a
plaintiff to voluntarily insert himself or herself into a public controversy in order to influ-
ence the resolution of the issues involved before that individual could be deemed a public
figure. Id. at 453-55; see also Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 134-36 (1979) (criticism
of plaintiff by United States Senator and public response by plaintiff did not make him a
"public figure").
53. 418 U.S. at 339-43. The Court cited with approval Justice Stewart's observation
that an individual's right to protect his or her reputation "reflects no more than our basic
concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being-a concept at the root of
any decent system of ordered liberty. The protection of private personality, like the protec-
tion of life itself, is left primarily to the individual States under the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments. But this does not mean that the right is entitled to any less recognition by this
Court as a basis of our Constitutional system." Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966)
(Stewart, J., concurring).
54. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-45 (1974).
55. Id. at 344.
56. Id. at 346-47.
57. Id. at 347.
58. Id. at 345-47.
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private defamation actions. ''59
The Gertz case re-established that the notoriety of the plaintiff,
rather than the public interest in the subject matter of the publication,
would determine what standard would be applied in a defamation ac-
tion against a media defendant. Thus, a public official or figure must
show that the defendant published the defamatory statement with
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.60 The states
could impose any standard except strict liability in actions brought by
private plaintiffs.61
California Defamation Law
In California, the common law rules of defamation have been
codified to a large extent in the California Civil Code.62 Section 47 of
the Civil Code delineates those communications that are privileged. 63
Subdivision three of this section remains essentially as it was when en-
acted,64 and currently provides:
A privileged publication or broadcast is one made: . . . In a
communication, without malice, to a person interested therein, (1) by
one who is also interested, or (2) by one who stands in such relation
to the person interested as to afford a reasonable ground for suppos-
ing the motive for the communication innocent, or (3) who is re-
quested by the person interested to give the information. 65
This section appears to be a codification of the "interested per-
sons" privilege. 66 This privilege protects otherwise defamatory publi-
cations in certain business or social situations when the communicating
parties have a special interest in communicating with one another or a
59. Id. at 350.
60. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
61. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
62. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 44-48 (West 1954 & Supp. 1981). The sections concerning defa-
mation were part of the original enactment of the code in 1872. See note 8 & accompanying
text supra. These sections, with the rest of the original Civil Code, were adopted primarily
from David Dudley Field's proposed Civil Code for the State of New York, which was an
attempted codification of civil common law. Van Alstyne, The Ca4fonia Civil Code,
Foreward to CAL. CIv. CODE (West 1954).
63. CAL. CIV. CODE § 47 (West Supp. 1981) provides: "A privileged publication or
broadcast is one made-1. In the proper discharge of an official duty. 2. In any (1) legisla-
tive or (2) judicial proceeding, or (3) in any other official proceeding authorized by law, or
(4) in the initiation or course of any other proceeding authorized by law .... 4. By a fair
and true report in a public journal, of(1) a judicial, (2) legislative, or (3) other public official
proceeding, or (4) of anything said in the course thereof, ... 5. By a fair and true report of
(I) the proceeding of a public meeting, ... or (2) the publication of the matter complained
of was for the public benefit."
64. See Lgislative History, CAL. CIV. CODE § 47 (West 1954).
65. CAL. CIV. CODE § 47 (West Supp. 1981).
66. See Swift & Co. v. Gray, 101 F.2d 976, 979-80 (9th Cir. 1939).
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duty to communicate. 67 In general, the privilege protects only commu-
nications between individuals68 or publications of limited circulation 69
with a limited and definable group of interested persons. 70 The ration-
ale of this privilege is that the persons involved have a special interest
in the subject matter under discussion and should be free to communi-
cate with one another on these matters despite the possible disparage-
ment of an individual's reputation.7'
As originally interpreted, section 47(3) of the Civil Code was lim-
ited to the interested person's privilege. 72 This subdivision, however,
was later judicially construed to encompass the privilege of fair com-
ment.73 This conclusion is not mandated by the language of the statute,
but rather is the result of judicial interpretation. In Snively v. Record
Publishing Co. ,74 the scope of section 47(3) was extended to govern
false, defamatory statements made to the general public concerning a
public official. In Snively, the defendant newspaper published a car-
toon characterizing the plaintiff, the Los Angeles Chief of Police, as one
who had accepted or was willing to accept bribes. The California
Supreme Court held that the publication was privileged fair comment
67. Brokate v. Hehr Mfg. Co., 243 Cal. App. 2d 133, 138, 52 Cal. Rptr. 672, 677 (1966).
See generally 50 AM. JUR. 2d Libel and Slander § 195 (1970); 53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander
§ 89 (1948).
68. Martin v. Kearny, 51 Cal. App. 3d 309, 124 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1975) (letter from par-
ent to principal concerning teacher); Deaile v. General Telephone Co., 40 Cal. App. 3d 841,
115 Cal. Rptr. 582 (1974) (communication between supervisors concerning employee); Neal
v. Gatlin, 35 Cal. App. 3d 871, 111 Cal. Rptr. 117 (1973) (communication between past and
prospective employers concerning employee); White v. State, 17 Cal. App. 3d 621, 95 Cal.
Rptr. 175 (1971) (communication between law enforcement agencies concerning criminal
record). See generally PROSSER, supra note 11, § 115, at 785-92; 50 AM. JUR. 2d Libel and
Slander §§ 201-219 (1970); 53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander §§ 106-115, 120 (1948).
69. Maidman v. Jewish Publications, Inc., 54 Cal. 2d 643, 355 P.2d 265 (1960); Brewer
v. Second Baptist Church, 32 Cal. 2d 791, 197 P.2d 713 (1948) (publications within religious
groups); Emde v. San Joaquin County Cent. Labor Council, 23 Cal. 2d 146, 143 P.2d 20
(1943); Doria v. International Union, Allied Indus. Workers of America, 196 Cal. App. 2d
22, 16 Cal. Rptr. 429 (1961) (articles in union publications concerning labor controversies).
70. Examples of this privilege include communications between past and prospective
employers concerning a prospective employee, Neal v. Gatlin, 35 Cal. App. 3d 871, 111 Cal.
Rptr. 117 (1973), publications by a credit agency concerning the status of a business or indi-
vidual, Roemer v. Retail Credit Co., 3 Cal. App. 3d 368, 83 Cal. Rptr. 540 (1970), and
communications between members of a church group, Brewer v. Second Baptist Church, 32
Cal. 2d 791, 197 P.2d 713 (1948), a labor union, Emde v. San Joaquin County Cent. Labor
Council, 23 Cal. 2d 146, 143 P.2d 20 (1943), or a family concerning their internal affairs,
McBride v. Ledoux, 111 La. 398, 35 So. 615 (1904).
7 1. See generally 50 AM. JUR. 2d Libel and Slander § 276 (1970). See note 16 & accom-
panying text supra.
72. See National Cash Register Co. v. Sailing, 173 F.2d 22 (9th Cir. 1909); Preston v.
Frey, 91 Cal. 107 (1891); Adams v. Cameron, 27 Cal. App. 625, 150 P. 1005 (1915).
73. Snively v. Record Publishing Co., 185 Cal. 565, 198 P. 1 (1921); Williams v. Daily
Review, Inc., 236 Cal. App. 2d 405, 46 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1965).
74. 185 Cal. 565, 198 P. 1 (1921).
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on the official conduct of a public official protected by section 47(3).75
The court reasoned that the public constituted "interested persons" and
that the relationship between the newspaper and the public afforded a
reasonable basis for finding that the newspaper had an innocent motive
within the meaning of section 47(3).76
In a subsequent case, Glenn v. Gibson,77 a California court of ap-
peal expanded the statute to cover any situation involving a "suffi-
ciently important public interest. 78 In Glenn, the defendant
newspaper published a story regarding a police raid of the plaintiff's
hotel. The defendant's article correctly reported that the plaintiffs were
charged with, but not convicted of, operating a house of prostitution.79
The court of appeal affirmed the sustaining of the defendant's demur-
rer80 on the grounds that the complaint failed to allege that the state-
ments concerning the plaintiff were not substantially true, that the
article was a privileged report of a judicial proceeding, and that the
story was privileged because it was a subject of "sufficiently important
public interest." 8'
The public interest privilege created in this case is essentially the
same privilege created by the United States Supreme Court in Rosen-
bloom82 and later rejected in Gertz. 3 The plurality in Rosenbloom as-
serted that the plaintiff should be required to prove actual malice to
recover whenever the communication involved "matters of public or
general concern. 84 The California court in Glenn v. Gibson relied on
the Restatement of Torts for the proposition that statements were con-
ditionally privileged whenever the statements "affect a sufficiently im-
portant public interest, ' s5 and, thus, could be actionable only when
malice was demonstrated. Thus, section 47(3), originally interpreted as
the interested persons privilege,8 6 has been expanded by the courts to
include the privilege of fair comment on public officials and candi-
75. Id. at 570-72, 198 P. at 2-3.
76. Id. at 570-71, 198 P. at 3.
77. 75 Cal. App. 2d 649, 171 P.2d 118 (1946).
78. Id at 659, 171 P.2d at 124 (quoting 3 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 598 (1938)).
79. Id. at 650-58, 171 P.2d at 119-24.
80. Id. at 662, 171 P.2d at 131.
81. Id. at 658-60, 171 P.2d at 123-25. The first two grounds would have been sufficient
by themselves to sustain the judgment, thus making the extension of § 47(3) to include a
public interest privilege unnecessary.
82. See notes 44-46 & accompanying text supra.
83. See notes 48-59 & accompanying text supra.
84. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 44 (1971).
85. Glenn v. Gibson, 75 Cal. App. 2d, 649, 659, 171 P.2d 118, 124 (1946) (quoting 3
RESTATEMENT OF TORTs § 598 (1938)).
86. The following cases rejected the privilege defense, but asserted that a privilege
would have existed under § 47(3) had it not been for a showing of malice. National Cash
Register Co. v. Sailing, 173 F.2d 22 (9th Cir. 1909) (letter from employer to his agent con-
cerning employee); Preston v. Frey, 91 Cal. 107 (1891) (slanderous verbal communication);
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dates87 and matters of public concern.88
The Malice Standard in California
Communications covered by section 47(3) receive only a qualified
privilege, and can be lost if the defendant acted with common law mal-
ice. 89 The California Civil Code defines malice as:
That state of mind arising from hatred or ill will toward the plaintiff;
provided, however, that such a state of mind occasioned by a good
faith belief on the part of the defendant in the truth of the libelous
publication or broadcast at the time it is published or broadcast shall
not constitute actual malice. 90
In California, either hatred or ill will towards the plaintiff or lack of a
good faith belief in the truth of the statement are sufficient to sustain a
finding of malice. 91
The first type of malice requiring a showing of hatred or ill will is
found when the defendant's motivation for publishing a defamatory
statement stems from a desire to harm the plaintiff.92 Only a handful
of published California cases have found such ill will on the part of a
media defendant. In Shumate v. Johnson Publishing Co. ,93 the court
found that the article published by the defendant suggested that "plain-
tiff had had 'pre-marital sexual relations,' that she is one of those who
'cheat on their husbands,' that she may be one who has 'homosexual
contacts,' and that she may be one who commits 'unnatural, immoral,
abnormal or indecent acts.' -94 Upholding the jury's finding of malice,
the court of appeal noted that there was no evidence that any of these
charges was true in any respect and that the defendant had received
Adams v. Cameron, 27 Cal. App. 625, 150 P. 1005 (1915) (letter to employer concerning
conduct of employee).
In rejecting a public interest privilege, the court in Wilson v. Fitch, 41 Cal. 363, 382
(1871), held: "[A] defamatory publication in a public journal [cannot] be said to be privi-
leged simply because it relates to a subject of public interest, and was published in good
faith, without malice and from laudible motives." Accord Newby v. Times-Mirror Co., 173
Cal. 387, 160 P. 233 (1916); Gilman v. McClatchey, 111 Cal. 606, 614 P. 241 (1896); Edwards
v. San Jose Printing & Publishing Soc., 99 Cal. 431, 34 P. 128 (1893).
87. Snively v. Record Publishing Co., 185 Cal. 565, 198 P. 1 (1921); Eva v. Smith, 89
Cal. App. 324, 264 P. 803 (1928).
88. Glenn v. Gibson, 75 Cal. App. 2d 649, 171 P.2d 118 (1946).
89. CAL. CIV. CODE § 47(3) (West Supp. 1981); see Roemer v. Retail Credit Co., 3 Cal.
App. 3d 368, 370-71, 83 Cal. Rptr. 540, 542 (1970).
90. CAL. CIV. CODE § 48a(4)(d) (West 1954).
91. Sanborn v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 18 Cal. 3d 406, 413, 556 P.2d 764, 768, 134
Cal. Rptr. 402, 406 (1976) (quoting Roemer v. Retail Credit Co., 44 Cal. App. 3d 926, 936,
119 Cal. Rptr. 82, 86 (1975)).
92. Agarwal v. Johnson, 25 Cal. 3d 932, 944, 603 P.2d 58, 65, 160 Cal. Rptr. 141, 148
(1979).
93. 139 Cal. App. 2d 121, 293 P.2d 531 (1956).
94. Id. at 132, 293 P.2d at 539.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33
CALIFORNIA DEFAMATION LAW
notice three months prior to publication that the accusations were false.
The court concluded that the trier of fact could infer malice from the
tenor of the article and other circumstantial evidence. 95 Malice was
also found inMaidman v. Jewish Publications, Inc. ,96 in which an edito-
rial in a newspaper serving the Southern California Jewish community
defamed the officer of a rival newspaper. The editorial accused the
plaintiff, an attorney and a prominent member of the Jewish commu-
nity, of unprofessional conduct and ignorance of the tenets of the Jew-
ish faith.97 This publication was made in the context of a continuing,
long-standing feud evidenced by a series of abusive editorials directed
by the two papers at each other.98 The court held that these facts justi-
fied a finding that the editorial was published primarily because of ha-
tred or ill will towards the plaintiff.99 The paucity of cases finding the
existence of this ill will, coupled with the extreme circumstances of
those few cases, indicates that California courts have traditionally been
reluctant to find that the media defendant has acted with ill will.
Malice may also be found when the defendant lacks reasonable
grounds for belief in the truth of the defamatory statement. i00 Lack of
reasonable grounds for believing the truth of the statements involves a
"reckless disregard of the plaintiffs rights."10' Exactly what this stan-
dard means is not clear, but it has been stated that lack of a reasonable
belief requires, as does the federal standard, a showing of "something
more than mere negligence."' 10 2
95. Id. at 137, 293 P.2d at 542.
96. 54 Cal. 2d 643, 355 P.2d 265 (1960).
97. Id. at 646-47, 355 P.2d at 266-67.
98. Id. at 648, 355 P.2d at 267.
99. Id. at 653-54, 355 P.2d at 271. In a third case, Scott v. Times-Mirror Co., 181 Cal.
345, 184 P. 672 (1919), the plaintiff, an attorney, had defended certain individuals charged
with blowing up the Los Angeles Times building. The Times embarked on a series of de-
famatory articles and editorials over a three-year period concerning the plaintiff. Id. at 347-
55, 184 P. at 674-77. The California Supreme Court concluded that the tenor of the articles
and the surrounding circumstances sufficiently supported a finding of malice. See id. at 358,
184 P. at 678.
100. MacLeod v. Tribune Publishing Co., 52 Cal. 2d 536, 552, 343 P.2d 36, 45 (1959).
Cf. CAL. CIV. CODE § 48a(4)(d) (West 1954) ("provided, however, that such a state of mind
occasioned by a good faith belief on the part of the defendant in the truth of the libelous
publication... shall not constitute actual malice").
101. Sanborn v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 18 Cal. 3d 406, 413, 556 P.2d 764, 768, 134
Cal. Rptr. 402, 406 (1976) (quoting Roemer v. Retail Credit Co., 44 Cal. App. 3d 926, 936,
119 Cal. Rptr. 82, 86 (1975)).
102. Compare id with the federal standard set forth in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964). See text accompanying note 36 supra.
If malice did not require something more than mere negligence, the whole concept of
qualified privilege would be meaningless; even absent a privilege, negligence would result in
liability.
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The Effect of United States Supreme Court Cases on California Law
The decisions of the United States Supreme Court concerning def-
amation have had at least two major effects on California defamation
law. First, in response to United States Supreme Court decisions re-
garding public officials or figures, California courts began applying the
New York Times standard of actual malice rather than the section 47(3)
privilege in cases involving a public official's or a public figure's suit
against a media defendant. 10 3 Second, following Gertz, the California
courts have been reluctant to rely upon the public interest privilege
even in cases involving private plaintiffs.104
In Gertz, the Court held that a private plaintiff suing a media de-
fendant for defamation must show that the defendant was at least neg-
ligent to establish liability.105 Although not declaring the Rosenbloom
public interest privilege 10 6 unconstitutional, the Gertz decision found
that the privilege was not constitutionally mandated and treated it with
disfavor. 0 7 Following Gertz, the California courts have consistently
applied the analysis set forth in New York Times and Gertz in deter-
mining whether a media defendant's publication was protected. 0 8 The
determination of whether actual malice or mere negligence was re-
quired to establish liability depended on whether the plaintiff was a
public official or figure or a private individual. 0 9
103. Weingarten v. Block, 102 Cal. App. 3d 129, 162 Cal. Rptr. 701, cert. denied, 449
U.S. 899 (1980) (city attorney, public official and public figure); Sierra Breeze v. Superior
Court, 86 Cal. App. 3d 102, 149 Cal. Rptr. 914 (1978) (county supervisor, public official);
Widener v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 75 Cal. App. 3d 415, 142 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1977), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 918 (1978) (film producer, public figure); Montandon v. Triangle Publica-
tions, Inc., 45 Cal. App. 3d 938, 120 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1975) (author, public figure).
104. Rancho La Costa, Inc. v. Superior Court, 106 Cal. App. 3d 646, 165 Cal. Rptr. 347
(1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 902 (1981); Franklin v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks
Lodge No. 1108, 97 Cal. App. 3d 915, 159 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1979).
105. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); accord Widener v. Pacific Gas &
Electric Co., 75 Cal. App. 3d 415, 433, 142 Cal. Rptr. 303, 313 (1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S.
918 (1978): "Where aprivate individual has been defamed, actual malice need not be shown
in order to recover for defamation. Only negligence as to the statement's truth or falsity
need be shown when resolving the libel claims of private individuals." (Emphasis in
original.)
106. See notes 43-46 & accompanying text supra.
107. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-48 (1974).
108. Vegod Corp. v. American Broadcasting Co., 25 Cal. 3d 763, 603 P.2d 14, 160 Cal.
Rptr. 97 (1979); Rancho La Costa, Inc. v. Superior Court, 106 Cal. App. 3d 646, 165 Cal.
Rptr. 347 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 902 (1981); Franklin v. Benevolent & Protective
Order of Elks Lodge No. 1108, 97 Cal. App. 3d 915, 159 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1979).
109. Vegod Corp. v. American Broadcasting Co., 25 Cal. 3d 763, 769-70, 603 P.2d 14, 18,
160 Cal. Rptr. 97, 101 (1979) (no public status, no privilege); Weingarten v. Block, 102 Cal.
App. 3d 129, 162 Cal. Rptr. 701, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899 (1980) (city attorney, public figure
and public official); Sierra Breeze v. Superior Court, 86 Cal. App. 3d 102, 149 Cal. Rptr. 914
(1978) (county supervisor, public official); Widener v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 75 Cal.
App. 3d 415, 142 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1977), cer. denied, 436 U.S. 918 (1978) (film producer,
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Although the California Supreme Court has not overruled older
cases finding a separate public interest privilege, recent California cases
have either ignored'10 or rejected the privilege. 1II In Vegodv. American
Broadcasting Co. ,112 for example, the defendant television station aired
a story accusing a business of false advertising. The California
Supreme Court decided that the plaintiffs status as a commercial enter-
prise did not automatically make the plaintiff a "public figure," and
thus it was not necessary to show that the defendant acted with actual
malice. 113 The court stated that whether the company was involved in
a matter of public interest was irrelevant because "[t]he public interest
test was expressly rejected in Gertz."114
Rolienhagen v. City of Orange and the Standard of Recovery
In February 1981, a California appellate court re-established the
vitality of the public interest privilege and the propriety of the Califor-
nia malice standard in defamation cases involving media defendants
and private plaintiffs. In Rollenhagen v. City of Orange,"l 5 a California
appellate court refused to hold liable a media defendant for broadcast-
ing statements disparaging the private plaintiffs business practices on
the grounds that the communication was protected by the public inter-
est privilege. Rollenhagen was a self-employed auto repairman. As
part of an investigation of Rollenhagen, detective Sirks of the City of
public figure); Montandon v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 45 Cal. App. 3d 938, 120 Cal. Rptr.
186 (1975) (author, public figure).
110. See Vegod Corp. v. American Broadcasting Co., 25 Cal. 3d 763, 603 P.2d 14, 160
Cal. Rptr. 97 (1979).
111. See Rancho La Costa, Inc. v. Superior Court, 106 Cal. App. 3d 646, 165 Cal. Rptr.
347 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 902 (1981).
112. 25 Cal. 3d 763, 603 P.2d 14, 160 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1979).
113. Id. at 769-70, 603 P.2d at 18, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
114. Id. at 769, 603 P.2d at 18, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 101. The court mentioned in a footnote
that it was expressing no view concerning whether there was an applicable privilege under
California law. Id. at 770 n.1, 603 P.2d at 18 n.l, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 101 n.1.
In Franklin v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks Lodge No. 1108, 97 Cal. App. 3d
915, 159 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1979), a magazine criticized a teacher for distributing certain read-
ing material in her class and falsely stated that she had been fired from her former job and
had been refused work elsewhere. The court found that the teacher was neither a public
official nor a public figure and thus she was not required to show that the defendant acted
with actual malice regardless of the public interest in the matter communicated. Id. at 931,
159 Cal. Rptr. at 141.
The court cited the following United States Supreme Court reasoning in rejecting the
public interest privilege: "A private individual is not automatically transformed into a pub-
lic figure just by becoming involved in or associated with a matter that attracts public atten-
tion. To accept such reasoning would in effect re-establish the doctrine advanced. .. in
Rosenbloom .... We repudiated this proposition in Gertz. . .. however, and we reject it
again today." Id. at 928, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 139 (quoting Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n,
Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 167 (1979)).
115. 116 Cal. App. 3d 414, 172 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1981).
March 1982] CALIFORNIA DEFAMATION LAW
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Orange Police Department arranged to have Rollenhagen perform
work on a car that Sirks later claimed to be in no need of repair except
for an inoperative spark plug. After Rollenhagen worked on the car
without giving Sirks a written estimate as required by law, Sirks ar-
ranged to have the defendant Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS)
film Rollenhagen's arrest for failing to give a written estimate. CBS
conducted an interview with Sirks and with Elizabeth Mazur, a dissat-
isfied customer, in which Mazur suggested that she had been victimized
by Rollenhagen. CBS broadcasted these interviews along with a brief
interview with the plaintiff. 1 6 Rollenhagen brought a defamation ac-
tion against the City of Orange, CBS, and Mazur. After the
jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff against CBS and Mazur, the
trial court entered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict for the
defendants. 117
Affirming the trial court's decision, the court of appeal observed
that the Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 118 "specifically recognized
the rights of individual states to apply any reasonable standard-short
of absolute liability,"''119 and cited four cases in other states that pur-
portedly rejected the negligence standard permitted in Gertz.120 Based
on this interpretation, the court stated that section 47(3) of the Civil
Code provided that matters of public interest are privileged regardless
of the plaintiff's status.121
In reaching its decision, the Rollenhagen court noted that another
California appellate court had rejected this interpretation of section
47(3).122 In Rancho La Costa, Inc. v. Superior Court,123 the court had
concluded that California Civil Code section 47(3) applied only to the
common law interested persons privilege, 124 publications to a local or
special interest group, and comments concerning public officials. 125
Thus, the Rancho La Costa court had held that the privilege was inap-
plicable to a story in a national magazine accusing plaintiffs of being
116. Id. at 419, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 51-52.
117. The city was dismissed. Id. at 416, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 50.
118. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
119. 116 Cal. App. 3d at 421, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 53.
120. Id. at 422, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 53 (citing Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 188
Colo. 86, 538 P.2d 450, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975); Aafco Heating & Air Condition-
ing Co. v. Northwest Publishing, Inc., 162 Ind. App. 671, 321 N.E.2d 580 (1974), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 913 (1976); Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 341
N.E.2d 569, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1975); Newspaper Publishing Corp. v. Burke, 216 Va. 800, 224
S.E.2d 132 (1976)).
121. 116 Cal. App. 3d at 422, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 53.
122. Id. (quoting Rancho La Costa, Inc. v. Superior Court, 106 Cal. App. 3d 646, 165
Cal. Rptr. 347, 358-59 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 902 (1981)).
123. 106 Cal. App. 3d 646, 165 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 902 (1981).
124. Id. at 664-65, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 359. See notes 67-72 & accompanying text supra.
125. 106 Cal. App. 3d at 666-67, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
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organized crime figures: 2 6 "The State conditional privilege of section
47(3) does not apply to a publication by a magazine or newspaper
merely because it relates to a matter which may have general public
interest."127
The Rollenhagen court attempted to distinguish Rancho La Costa
by stating that the matter commented upon by the defendant in Rol-
lenhagen concerned a matter of serious public interest: "[T]he defini-
tion of interested as scrutinized by the [Rancho La Costa] court is
certainly broad enough to encompass [this] case. . . for the arena of
auto repair has been the subject of rather extensive legislative coverage
in an attempt to protect the public from fraudulent and dishonest prac-
tices."128 The Rollenhagen court found a privilege to exist. The court
next considered whether the plaintiff had demonstrated the existence of
malice necessary to overcome the privilege.12 9 In considering this issue,
the court applied the California statutory definition of malice.13 0 The
Rollenhagen court was thus the first California court to apply the Cali-
fornia malice standard to a media defendant since the United States
Supreme Court decided Gertz.' 31
The Rollenhagen court's choice of the California malice standard
was appropriate for two reasons. First, the defendant relied on a statu-
tory privilege, 32 and the California malice standard is a part of the
same statutory scheme. 133 The California decisions prior to Rol-
lenhagen had used the statutory malice standard when the existence of
a public interest privilege was at issue.134 In addition, other qualified
state privileges apart from the "public interest" privilege exist 35 and
the cases that address these privileges have continued to employ the
California malice standard in determining the viability of a privi-
lege. 136 Second, although the federal malice standard constitutionally
126. Id. at 667, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
127. Id. at 664, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 358-59.
128. 116 Cal. App. 3d 414, 172 Cal. Rptr. 49, 56 (1981).
129. Id. at 428-29, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 57. See notes 21-24 & accompanying text supra.
130. 116 Cal. App. 3d 414, 428-29, 172 Cal. Rptr. 49, 57 (1981).
131. Prior to Rollenhagen, the last case applying the ill will standard to a media defend-
ant was Maidman v. Jewish Publications, Inc., 54 Cal. 2d 643, 654, 355 P.2d 265, 271, 7 Cal.
Rptr. 617, 623 (1960).
132. CAL. Cry. CODE § 47(3) (West Supp. 1981).
133. Id. § 48a(4)(d) (West 1954).
134. See Williams v. Daily Review, Inc., 236 Cal. App. 2d 405, 46 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1965);
Howard v. Southern Cal. Ass'd Newspapers, 95 Cal. App. 2d 580, 213 P.2d 399 (1950);
Glenn v. Gibson, 75 Cal. App. 2d 649, 171 P.2d 118 (1946).
135. Presently the only publications that are protected by a qualified privilege in Cali-
fornia are those publications privileged under CAL. Civ. CODE § 47(3) (West Supp. 1981).
Since Gertz, this section has been applied primarily to the interested persons privilege.
136. See, e.g, Martin v. Kearny, 51 Cal. App. 3d 309, 124 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1975) (letter
from parent to principal concerning teacher); Deaile v. General Telephone Co., 40 Cal. App.
3d 841, 115 Cal. Rptr. 582 (1974) (communication between supervisors concerning em-
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must be employed when the plaintiff is a public official or a public
figure, 37 the state law may be applied when the plaintiff is a private
individual. 138
Applying the California malice standard, the Rollenhagen court
concluded that the statutory standard had not been met. 39 The court
found no evidence that the defendant harbored ill will or hatred to-
wards the plaintiff. 40 Neither had the plaintiff demonstrated malice by
showing that CBS lacked reasonable or probable cause to believe in the
truth of its publication. 41 Additionally, the court noted that mere neg-
ligence during an investigation was insufficient to establish malice. 42
By finding a privilege for media defendants to report on matters of
public interest regardless of the plaintiffs status and by requiring the
plaintiff to demonstrate common law malice by a media defendant to
overcome this privilege, the Rollenhagen court resurrected two obsolete
principles of California defamation law. First, the court relied on the
public interest privilege, which has not been accepted by California
courts, 43 and which has been considered only in cases decided prior to
ployee); Neal v. Gatlin, 35 Cal. App. 3d 871, 11 Cal. Rptr. 117 (1973) (communication be-
tween past and prospective employer concerning employee); White v. State, 17 Cal. App. 3d
621, 95 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1973) (communication between law enforcement agencies concerning
criminal record).
137. See notes 35-42 & accompanying text supra.
138. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).




143. No California Supreme Court case has relied on this privilege. Of the California
Supreme Court cases concerning this issue, Vegod Corp. v. American Broadcasting Co., 25
Cal. 3d 763, 603 P.2d 14, 160 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1979), found that in the absence of a "public
figure" or "public official" plaintiff there was no special privilege simply because the defam-
atory statement concerned a matter of public interest. Maidman v. Jewish Publications, Inc.,
54 Cal. 2d 643, 652, 355 P.2d 265, 270, 7 Cal. Rptr. 617, 622 (1960) (quoting W. PROSSER,
THE LAW OF TORTS 623 (2d ed. 1955)) declined to find a privilege when the comment was
not made "for the bona fide purpose of giving the public the benefit of comment which it is
entitled to have" even though the publication concerned a public figure in the Southern
California Jewish community in a paper distributed within that community. Emde v. San
Joaquin County Cent. Labor Council, 23 Cal. 2d 146, 143 P.2d 20 (1943), involved a publi-
cation concerning a labor controversy and was published in the Stockton Labor Journal, not
a newspaper of general circulation. The opinion, in finding a privilege, cited the important
right of labor, which was exercised in the article, to advocate the boycott of a company and
the special interest among readers of the labor journal in the subject matter. These decisions
do not support the proposition that private individuals may be defamed through the public
media as long as the story involves a matter of public interest.
In addition, only three court of appeal cases apart from Rollenhagen have based their
holdings on the privilege. Williams v. Daily Review, Inc., 236 Cal. App. 2d 405, 46 Cal.
Rptr. 135 (1965), involved criticism of the work of a firm contracted to perform street pav-
ing. The publication was also found privileged as a report of an official proceeding. How-
ard v. Southern Cal. Ass'd Newspapers, 95 Cal. App. 2d 580, 213 P.2d 399 (1950), found
[Vol. 33
Gertz. Second, the court required the plaintiff to make the statutory
showing of malice.
The Public Interest Privilege
In Gertz, the United States Supreme Court noted the inappropri-
ateness of applying a public interest privilege as a defense to an alleg-
edly defamatory statement published by a media defendant: "[This
application] would occasion the additional difficulty of forcing state
and federal judges to decide on an ad hoc basis which publications
address issues of 'general public interest,' and which do not. . . .We
doubt the wisdom of committing this task to the conscience of
judges." 144 There is little that cannot be considered a matter of public
interest because the determination of what constitutes a matter of pub-
lic interest is subjective. As the factors constituting a matter of public
interest are ill-defined, it may be difficult for a judge to determine
whether a particular matter is of public interest. Thus, the results may
be difficult to predict and unharmonious. 45
In addition, the interest of defamed individuals in protecting their
reputations and being compensated for injurious falsehoods may be
frustrated by the broad interpretation of what constitutes a matter of
public interest and what is thus covered by the privilege.' 46 In Rol
lenhagen, for example, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff and
thus presumably found CBS to have been negligent. The trial court
thereafter concluded that automobile repair was a matter of public in-
terest and entered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict for the de-
fendant.' 47 Thus, one who has an otherwise valid cause of action for
defamation may be denied recovery because of his or her involvement
privileged as a subject of public interest criticism directed at a campaign organized to recall
certain public officials. See also Glenn v. Gibson, 75 Cal. App. 2d 649, 171 P.2d 118 (1946).
See notes 77-83 & accompanying text supra.
144. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974).
145. In California, for example, the paving of streets, Williams v. Daily Review, Inc.,
236 Cal. App. 2d 405, 46 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1965), and the repair of automobiles, Rollenhagen
v. City of Orange, 116 Cal. App. 414, 172 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1981), have been found to be
matters of public interest sufficient to invoke the privilege. In other cases, a public interest
has been found, but the public interest privilege was not applied. See, e.g., Vegod Corp. v.
American Broadcasting Co., 25 Cal. 3d 763, 603 P.2d 14, 160 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1979) (false
advertising); Rancho La Costa, Inc. v. Superior Court, 106 Cal. App. 3d 646, 165 Cal. Rptr.
347 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 902 (1981) (organized crime); Franklin v. Benevolent &
Protective Order of Elks Lodge No. 1108, 97 Cal. App. 3d 915, 159 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1979)
(high school reading material).
146. California case law demonstrates that it is extremely difficult to show that a media
defendant has acted with malice. See notes 93-99 & accompanying text supra. If a demon-
stration of malice is required whenever a court deems the subject matter of the communica-
tion to be in the public interest, this requirement might deprive plaintiffs with otherwise
meritorious claims of recovery.
147. 116 Cal. App. 3d at 416, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 50.
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in a controversy, lifestyle, or occupation, which a court may deem to
concern a matter of public interest.
Another problem with the public interest privilege is that, as the
Supreme Court noted in Gertz, the reasons for holding public officials
and figures to a more stringent standard for recovery do not apply to
private individuals regardless of the public interest in their activities;
private individuals do not voluntarily invite the close scrutiny that pub-
lic persons invite, nor do private individuals have the same opportuni-
ties to rebut public criticism. 48 Thus, a plaintiff who has not sought
notoriety and who may not have access to the media to rebut any defa-
mation published may be foreclosed from recovery because the court
determines that the individual is involved in a matter of public interest.
The Application of Malice
Under the Rollenhagen decision, once a public interest privilege is
found to exist, only a showing of hatred or ill will towards the plaintiff,
or reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights can overcome it.'49 A find-
ing of privilege, however, is difficult to rebut by a showing of malice.' 50
Application of the California malice standard to a privileged communi-
cation, therefore, often shields the immense power of the media while
leaving the relatively powerless private individual without redress, de-
spite the potentially irreparable harm to his or her reputation caused by
the defamatory publication.
Furthermore, the common law malice requirement that is neces-
sary to refute the privilege focuses on the defendant's motivation. Un-
like the actual malice standard in New York Times, the California
standard may be met by a showing of ill will on the part of the defend-
ant. 15 1 The fact that a media defendant harbors no ill will towards the
plaintiff, however, does not lessen the damage the plaintiff may suffer.
The defendant's motivation in publishing or broadcasting sensational
stories may be to maintain or increase its audience rather than because
of his or her ill will towards the subject of the story. Under Rol-
lenhagen, a defendant might negligently publish a defamatory story in
the name of the public interest, thereby damaging the reputation or
business of a private individual, and yet be protected from liability be-
148. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-48 (1974).
149. 116 Cal. App. 3d at 422-23, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 53-54.
150. See, e.g., Weingarten v. Block, 102 Cal. App. 3d 129, 162 Cal. Rptr. 701, cert. de-
nied, 449 U.S. 899 (1980); Katz v. Rosen, 48 Cal. App. 3d 1032, 121 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1975);
Deaile v. General Telephone Co., 40 Cal. App. 3d 841, 115 Cal. Rptr. 582 (1974); McCunn
v. California Teachers Ass'n, 3 Cal. App. 3d 956, 83 Cal. Rptr. 846 (1970); Smith v. Hatch,
271 Cal. App. 2d 39, 76 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1969); Noonan v. Rousselot, 239 Cal. App. 2d 447, 48
Cal. Rptr. 817 (1966).




cause the defendant lacked the ill will or hatred that constitutes malice.
Malice can also be established by showing that the defendant acted
with a reckless disregard for the plaintiffs rights. 152 This standard,
similar to that established in New York Times, will be more difficult to
prove than the negligence standard set forth in Gertz for private figure
defamation actions. Thus, in those cases in which a defendant suc-
cessfully asserts a public interest privilege defense, the plaintiff will find
it more difficult to overcome the privilege than he or she would find if
the privilege were judicially discarded and the plaintiff merely were
required to establish negligence by the media defendant.
The difficulties in finding and applying the malice standard in Cal-
ifornia establish further reasons for discarding the public interest privi-
lege. Because the existence of malice has been found so infrequently,
and because the extreme state of mind necessary to find an ill will is
difficult to establish, it is evident that malice based on ill will shall con-
tinue to be a largely unsuccessful device to overcome the public interest
privilege. Thus, the fact that the privilege may be unduly difficult to
overcome supports the refusal to apply the privilege in defamation
cases involving private plaintiffs.
A Proposal
The public interest privilege should be rejected and a negligence
standard applied when no other privilege is involved in defamation ac-
tions involving private plaintiffs. When injurious remarks are made
concerning private individuals, the publisher should use reasonable
care in ascertaining the truth of those statements. Such an approach
would be consistent with Gertz, which held that a plaintiff must show
only negligence concerning the truth or falsity of the communication in
a case against a private individual. 153 Following Gertz, the negligence
standard had been applied in California in actions by private individu-
als that did not involve a privilege.' 54 The court in Rollenhagen re-
jected this negligence standard because such a standard in a public
interest setting would promote self-censorship and cause publishers to
avoid controversial issues. 55 The court cited cases in four other juris-
dictions supporting this position.1 56 These cases, however, do not pro-
vide sound precedent for the court's decision in Rollenhagen.157
152. See notes 100-02 & accompanying text supra.
153. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
154. Widener v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 75 Cal. App. 3d 415,433, 142 Cal. Rptr. 304,
313 (1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 918 (1978).
155. See 116 Cal. App. 3d at 428-29, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 57.
156. See note 120 supra.
157. In one of the cited decisions, the court was deciding whether malice need be shown
to recover punitive damages, rather than whether malice was necessary to overcome the
public interest privilege. Newspaper Publishing Co. v. Burke, 216 Va. 800, 804-05, 224
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Moreover, a number of jurisdictions have decided to follow the posi-
tion advocated by the United States Supreme Court by employing a
negligence standard in private defamation actions regardless of the
public interest in the statements made. 58
The negligence standard should be followed in the case of a pri-
vate plaintiff unless a privilege other than that of public interest is in-
volved. 59 The publisher should be required to act in a reasonable
manner with due consideration of the standards of information gather-
ing and dissemination ordinarily followed by responsible parties. A
negligence analysis can consider the exigencies of reporting urgent
news and the availability of limited information or sources of uncertain
reliability. These factors should all be considerations in determining
the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct.
Conclusion
The United States Supreme Court, in a series of decisions com-
mencing in 1964, changed and influenced several aspects of defamation
law. Among these developments were the discreditation of the public
interest privilege, the establishment of the negligence standard as a
minimum for private plaintiffs in actions against media defendants,
and the abandonment of the hatred or ill will requirement in the defini-
tion of malice. After these opinions were announced, California courts
developed defamation law to parallel the United States Supreme Court
S.E.2d 132, 136 (1976). The court specifically declined to address the question whether a
negligence standard would be used in an action brought by a private plaintiff for actual
damages when a public interest is involved. "[I]t is unnecessary to our decision in this case
to determine the standard of liability which we will adopt in a proper case for recovery of
actual damages." Id. In Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 341
N.E.2d 569, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1975), the court stated that a private party defamed in an
article concerning matters of legitimate public concern may recover by meeting a standard
very similar to negligence. In such a case, the plaintiff must show "by apreponderance of the
evidence, that the publisher acted in a grossly irresponsible manner without due consideration
for the standards of information gathering and dissemination ordinarily follo wed by reason-
able parties." Id. at 199, 341 N.E.2d at 571, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 64 (emphasis added).
158. Dodrill v. Arkansas Democratic Co., 265 Ark. 628, 590 S.W.2d 840 (1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1076 (1980); Newell v. Field Ent., Inc., 91 In. App. 3d 735, 415 N.E.2d 434
(1980); Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 216 Kan. 223, 531 P.2d 76 (1975); Lawrence v. Bauer
Publishing & Printing Co., 176 N.J. Super. 378, 423 A.2d 655 (1980); Stone v. Essex County
Newspapers, Inc., 367 Mass. 849, 330 N.E.2d 161 (1975); Memphis Publishing Co. v. Nich-
ols, 569 S.W.2d 412 (Tenn. 1978); Taskett v. King Broadcasting Co., 86 Wash. 2d 439, 546
P.2d 81 (1976). See Columbus Times-Argus Ass'n, Inc., 135 Vt. 454, 380 A.2d 80 (1977):
Denny v. Mertz, 100 Wis. 332, 302 N.W.2d 503 (1981). See also Yerkie v. Post-Newsweek
Stations, Mich., Inc., 470 F. Supp. 91 (D. Md. 1979) (anticipating a similar rule in
Maryland).
159. Other important privileges remain that require that plaintiffs meet a tougher stan-
dard of recovery. See CAL. CiV. CODE § 47 (West Supp. 1981).
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decisions in this area.160 California defamation law, however, is in
danger of embracing the outdated and undesirable common law con-
cept of the public interest privilege and statutory definition of malice as
a result of a court of appeal decision, Rollenhagen v. City of Orange,16'
which re-established the public interest privilege with respect to private
plaintiffs' actions against media defendants. 162
The California decisions involving the public interest privilege
have manifested the fears of the United States Supreme Court ex-
pressed in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 163 The reasons for requiring a
showing of malice in actions brought by public persons are inapplica-
ble to private plaintiffs. Moreover, the determination of what is a
proper subject of public interest remains subjective because no clear or
consistent test has been formulated. The vagueness of the public inter-
est standard is reflected in the inconsistencies among defamation deci-
sions in this area. The result of this privilege is that private individual
plaintiffs are frequently not accorded the protection they deserve.
The California malice standard, unlike the federal standard, pro-
vides that a qualified privilege may be lost if the defendant is motivated
by hatred or ill will towards the plaintiff, or if the defendant acts with
reckless disregard for the truth. The difficulty of proving malice, how-
ever, means that the availability of malice will be of little assistance in
an action against a media defendant. As the case law demonstrates,
rarely are large media corporations found to harbor hatred or ill will
towards private plaintiffs. The public interest privilege should be dis-
carded and replaced by a general negligence standard in actions
brought by private individuals against media defendants when no other
privilege is involved.
David G. Farrington*
160. See Vegod Corp. v. American Broadcasting Co., 25 Cal. 3d 763, 603 P.2d 14, 160
Cal. Rptr. 97 (1979); Rancho La Costa, Inc. v. Superior Court, 106 Cal. App. 3d 646, 165
Cal. Rptr. 347 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 902 (1981); Franklin v. Benevolent & Protective
Order of Elks Lodge No. 1108, 97 Cal. App. 3d 915, 159 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1979).
161. 116 Cal. App. 3d 414, 172 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1981).
162. See notes 121-42 & accompanying text supra.
163. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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